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1. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Boise State University adopts, by reference, its statement of the Course of Proceedings 
set forth in the Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief in Support of Cross-Appeal. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Boise State University adopts, by reference, the Statement of Facts set forth 111 the 
Respondent/Cross-Appellant's Brief in Support of Cross-Appeal. 
III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS APPEAL 
1. Zylstra has waived any argument the district court elTed when it concluded that 
medical testimony was necessary to establish causation in order to avoid BSU's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
2. Zylstra has waived any argument the district court erred when it granted, in part, 
the BSU Motion to Strike portions of the affidavits of Stephanie Zylstra, Helen Zylstra, JefT 
Dolifka and Dale Dolifka. 
3. Zylstra has waived any argument that, after the district coU!1 granted, in part, 
BSU's Motion to Strike, the remaining record established an issue of material fact sufficient to 
avoid summary judgment. 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIE\V 
When reviewing a decision to strike affidavit testimony on evidentiary grounds offered in 
connection with a motion for summary judgment, the trial court's evidentiary ruling is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. See AED, Inc. v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159, 307 P.3d 
176 (2013); Gem State IllS. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 175 P.3d 172 (2007). The appellant 
must demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion and that its error atTected a substantial 
right. See Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18,278 P.3d 415, 420 (2012). The 
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admissibility of expert testimony offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment is 
committed to the discretion of the trial court. Athay v. Stacey, 142 Idaho 360, 366, 128 P.3d 
903 (2005). If the trial court's discretion is affected by an error of law, the appellate court 
"is to note the en-or made and remand the case for appropriate findings." Gem State IllS. Co. v. 
Hutchison, 145 Idaho at 16. 
V.ARGUMENT 
A. Any Arguments Challenging Portions Of The District Court's Ruling That are Not 
Set Forth in Zylstra's Opening Brief Are Waived. 
Under the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure, the appellant's opening brief must include 
a statement of the issues presented on appeal, and an argument. See I.A.R. 35(a)(4) and (6). The 
argument section must identity the legal issues to be considered and provide statutory or case 
authority supporting the issues the appellant feels the appellate court should consider. See I.A.R. 
35(a)(6). The appellate courts \vill not consider any issue which is not supported by propositions 
of law, authority, or argument. See Taylor v. Browning, 129 Idaho 483,490, 927 P.2d 873, 880 
(1996); Thomas v. l"Uedical Center Physiciam, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205-206, 61 P.3d 557, 562-
563 (2001); Gem State Ills. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 16, 175 P.3d 172, 178 (2007). The 
failure to raise legal issues in an appellant's opening brief v\<'ill preclude the appellate courts n"om 
addressing those matters. See Sun V(llley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 
87,803 P.2d 993 (1991); State v. Killinger, 126 Idaho 737,740,890 P.2d 323,326 (1995); State 
v. Raudeb{lugh, 124 Idaho 758, 763, 864 P.2d 596, 601 (1993). The Supreme Court will not 
consider issues raised for the first time in the reply brief. Id. 
The district court made three significant rulings that are not challenged in Zylstra's 
opening brief. First, the court ruled that, as part of his prima facie case, Zylstra was required to 
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present expert medical testimony establishing his injuries were caused by the decision of the 
BSU athletic staff to allow him to continue participating in the PAC-10 Tournament after he \vas 
injured m his first match. Tr. Vol. I, p. 109, L. 9; p. Ill, L.22. Second, the district court 
granted, in part, BSU's Motion to Strike the affidavits of lay witnesses, Stephanie Zylstra, Helen 
Zylstra, JetT Dolifl(a, and Dale Dolitka. Tr. Vol. I, p. 72, L. 22; p. 80, L. 8; R. Vol. I, p. 730-
731. Third, after granting, in part, BSU's Motion to Strike, the district court ruled the record did 
not establish a disputed issue of material fact concerning whether Zylstra's injuries and damages 
were caused by his continued participation in the PAC-I0 Tournament after he was initially 
injured. Tr. Vol. I, p. Ill, L. 23, p. 115, L. 16; R. Vol. I, p.733. 
Lacking in Zylstra's opening appellate brief is any argument that he \vas not required to 
establish causation through medical testimony. Additionally, Zylstra's opening brief fails to 
challenge the portions of the trial court's ruling striking, in part, the atTidavits of Stephanie 
Zylstra, Helen Zylstra, JefT Dolitka, and Dale Dolitka. Finally, Zylstra's opening brief does not 
discuss, or dispute that, in the absence of the atTidavits of Drs. Epperson and Brzusek, the record 
does not create an issue of material fact that his injuries were caused by the decision to allow him 
to continue wrestling in the tournament after he suffered his initial concussion. 
Any argument that the district court's rulings on these three issues was erroneous is, at 
this point, waived and cannot be raised in Zylstra'S reply brief. See Thomas v. "Medical Center 
Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 205-206, 61 P.3d 557, 562-563 (2001). Accordingly, the only 
remaining issue is whether the district court abused its discretion when it struck the affidavits of 
Drs. Epperson and Brzusek. If the trial court did not abuse its discretion in that regard, its ruling 
granting BSU's motion for summary judgment must be affirmed. 
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B. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Struck the Affidavits of 
Dr. Epperson and Dr. Brzusek. 
On June 4,2013, BSU filed its motion for summary judgment, R. Vol. I, p. 154-156, 
437-455. The motion was filed on the deadline established by the district court for filing 
dispositive motions. R. Vol. I, p. 21-24. Zylstra's response included the affidavits of Drs. 
Brzusek and Epperson. R. Vol. I, p. 508-538 and 539-554. BSU then filed a motion to strike 
arguing the affidavits of the two expe11s offered opinion testimony that had not been previously 
disclosed despite the fact those opinions had been requested through written discovery. R. Vol. 
I, p. 562-563. The district court agreed and granted BSU's motion. Tr. Vol. I, p. 56, L.8; p. 72, 
L. 21, R. Vol. I, p. 730. 
1. Legal standard governing admissibility of evidence in summary 
judgment proceedings. 
Affidavits offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment are governed by 
IRCP 56(e). The Rule requires affidavits contain testimony that would be admissible as if the 
affiant were testifying at trial. See Carnell v. Barker Managemellt, Inc., 137 Idaho 322, 327, 48 
P.3d 651, 656 (2002); Gem State IllS. Co. v. Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10,13,175 P.3d 172, 175 
(2007). A trial court's determination of the admissibility of testimony otfered in connection with 
a motion for summary judgment is revie'vved for an abuse of discretion. See Gem State 
Insurance Co., 145 Idaho at 14-15; see also Hopper v. Swin11 ertoll , 2013 WL 6198245 
(November 26, 2013). If affidavits are challenged, the trial court "must first make a threshold 
detennination as to the admissibility of the evidence 'before proceeding to the ultimate issue, 
whether summary judgment is appropriate. '" Gem State Insurance Co. v. Hutchinsoll, 145 
Idaho at 14. The decision ·'to exclude undisclosed expert testimony pursuant to l.R.C.P. 26 
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(e)(4) is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court." Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 
176, 180,219 PJd 1192, 1196 (2009). 
To detennine whether a district court has abused its discretion, this Court asks: 
( I) Whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal 
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) 
whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason. 
See Sirius LC v. Erickson, 150 Idaho 80, 87, 244 P.3d 224, 231 (2010); Sun Valley Shopping 
Center, Illc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). In this case, the 
district court granted BSe's motion to strike the Brzusek and Epperson affidavits because 
Zylstra was offering expert opinion testimony that had not been previously disclosed. Tr. VoL I, 
p. 56, L. 8; p. 72, L. 21. The court advised counsel for Zylstra that its ruling was not a sanction. 
Tr. VoL I, p. 160, L.16-25. Instead, the court was addressing a motion to strike brought pursuant 
to IRCP 56( e) and detem1ining whether the disputed evidence was admissible. 
In Hopper v. Swillltertolt, supra, this Court considered whether a trial court had abused 
its discretion when it struck an untimely affidavit. The trial co1ll1's ruling was affinned because 
it recognized the issue as one of discretion and "applied the correct legal standards because it 
analyzed the admissibility of the affidavits under IRCP 56(e)". Id. at *4. "[B]ecause the district 
court correctly identified [the] evidentiary decisions as calling for the exercise of its discretion, 
acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards, and 
reached its decisions by an exercise of reason, it did not abuse its discretion in striking" the 
of Tending affidavits. Id. 
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2. Factors considered by the District Court when it struck the affidavits of 
Brzusek and Epperson. 
On July 23, 2012, Zylstra provided answers to BSU's First Set of IntelTogatories and 
Requests for Production of Documents. R. Vol. I, p. 50, 57-58. IntelTogatory No.4 and Request 
for Production i'Jo. 1 asked Zylstra to identify experts who would testify at trial. Zylstra was 
asked to "state the subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify, the substance of the 
facts the expert has reviewed and is relying upon, and any and all opinions to which the expert is 
expected to testify." R. Vol. I, p. 57. Zylstra was also asked to produce copies of the expert's 
current cUlTiculum vitae, copies of materials the experts had reviewed in connection with the 
litigation and, all reports and draft reports they had authored. R. Vol. I, p. 58. Other than the 
report of Dr. Epperson, no other expert reports or materials were identified or produced prior to 
the filing of the BSU motion for summary judgment. [d. 
On April 8, 2013, almost a year after answering BSU's written discovery Zylstra 
submitted his expert disclosures as required by the court's scheduling order. R. Vol. I, p, 23; 61-
120. Dr. Brzusek was identified as an expert witness. Id. The disclosure identified areas of 
potential testimony for Epperson and Brzusek but, failed to describe any specific opinions 
addressing medical causation. R. Vol. I, p. 62-63. 1 On April 10, 2013, counsel for BSC 
communicated with Zylstra's attorney outlining deficiencies in plaintiff's answ'ers to discovery 
relating to expert witnesses and the fact the expert disclosure failed to disclose the actual 
opinions that would be offered by the various expert witnesses at trial. R. Vol. 1, p. 126-127. 
i Zylstra had produced the Epperson report. R. Vol. I, p. 58. Hov:ever, the report did not offer 
an opinion on medical causation and stated more information was needed to determine whether 
lylstra suffered additional II1juries by continuing to participate in the tournament. R. Vol. I, p. 
64; see also § C( I), infra. 
RESPONDENTS/CROSS-APPELLANTS STATE OF IDAHO, BOISE STATE UNIVERSITY'S 
RESPONSE BRIEF - 6 
Counsel responded stating "I do not agree with you that there is an obligation to provide full 
opinions and suppOliing materials by the deadline for disclosure of expert opinions." R. Vol. I, 
p. 129. Thereafter. on April 12,2013, BSU filed a motion to compel. R. VoL I., p. 39. 
At the May 9, 2013, hearing, BSU argued that Zylstra's expert disclosures and answers to 
discovery were inadequate because he had refused to provide the actual opinions to which his 
expert witnesses would testify at trial. Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, L. 1-17. The motion was not limited to 
Drs. Brzusek and Epperson. [d. The trial court agreed stating: 
THE COURT: Well, if what you're referring to and I'm looking 
at the plaintiffs list of experts, for example, that was attached to 
your affidavit. If what you're referring to is what they essentially 
said here are categories they're going to testify to, then 1 would 
agree with you, Mr. Collaer, that's not sufficient and doesn't 
answer Interrogatory No.4, nor does it respond to Request for 
Production No.1, that in this case you can't just say here's the 
general subject matter. You've got to disclose the actual opinions 
they're going to testify to, otherwise there's no point in having 
your there's nothing for your experts to respond to. And if that's 
what you're talking about, than 1 would tend to agree with you. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, L. 18 - p. 19, L.8. (emphasis added) Addressing the deficiency 
of the Brzusek disclosure, the district court stated: 
THE COURT: \Vell, I you know, with due respect, I'm looking 
at the responses here on the plaintiffs list of experts and I don't 
think you can avoid providing the material by simply saying, well, 
they're not really experts, they are they are treating physicians. 
Because, for example. 
THE COURT: For - because I'm going to give you an example. 
For example, you have a treating physician, Dr. Eggers, and he -
what you say is he can testify regarding his diagnosis, causation of 
the condition, appropriateness of treatment and future treatment 
and prognosis. Now, clearly he can talk about future treatment. 
He can talk about what he did. What he can't do is talk about 
causation because that's expert opinion. 
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But if you're going to be talking about causation or you're 
talking about things like - if he's going to talk about issues related 
to concussions in general, post-concussive symptoms, there's -
you're really walking a very fine line and you may find yourself 
here at trial up a creek. And so I think that's something you need 
to think about. 
Tr. VoL I, p. 19, L. 22 - p. 22, L. 3. The court concluded by warning Zylstra: 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's a possibility, but I will warn you 
that in the cases that I've had before, one of the things that happens 
is that they - there's not a timely supplementation and that's 
determined because you look at the dates that reports are received 
and things like that, then you still run the risk that something could 
be excluded. 
So I guess what I'm saying to all parties here is remember 
the purposes behind the rules is to provide a mechanism to insure 
that discovery is robust and that neither party goes into a trial with 
a hood over their eyes unless it's a hood of their own making. I 
think that's what I was trying to tell Mr. Collaer is the way I read 
the Idaho rules whereas the federal rules now basically put all the 
burden on the parties to disclose without any action on the part of a 
party. I don't think the Idaho rules have gone that far. And I think 
Tr. Vo!.I, p. 22, L.14 - p. 23, L.8. (emphasis added) 
BSU then posed the hypothetical situation where an element of the plaintiffs prima facie 
case required expert testimony and, until a motion for summary judgment was filed at the 
dispositive motion deadline, the plaintiff had failed to disclose expert opinions needed to support 
their claim. BSU suggested that scenario would cause the defendant to file a motion to strike 
expert opinions disclosed for the first time to oppose the motion for summary judgment. Tr. Vo!' 
I, p. 24, L.l 0-24. The trial court responded stating: 
THE COURT: Well, I'll tell you the way I see this. I'm not going 
to rule in a vacuum. I'm probably fairly well known as being 
pretty strict with the rules and pretty strict with the pre-trial orders. 
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[t would be an extraordinary situation for me to allow someone 
close to trial to change the opinions such that it would prejudice 
the othcr side. 
So, I guess, that's the only way - I can't tell you that it's 
necessarily going to be granted, but I can tell you that I'm not 
afraid of granting it. So - but I can't rule in a vacuum because 1 
don't know what the circumstances are. 
And the reason I'm saying that is that I have had an 
occasion where new a new medical problem arose subsequent to 
discovery. So I'm not going to say, \·ve II , that's just tough. That's 
- it may result in the trial being changed if that were to occur. But 
so I'm not going to give you a ruling in advance. 
If that occurs if your scenario occurs, I can assure you 
that 1 do believe in enforcing the rules, so -
Tr. Vol. I, p. 24, L. 25 - p. 25, L.22. 
Following the motion to compel hearing, the parties continued with discovery and 
preparing for trial. Despite the hypothetical posed by BSU at the May 9, 2013, hearing and, the 
waming the trial court provided to Zylstra that his expert disclosures were not adequate, Zylstra 
did not supplement his answers to discovery or his expert disclosures prior to the discovery cut-
otT or the dispositive motion deadline. BSU filed its motion for summary judgment on June 4, 
2013, the date established as the deadline for dispositive motions. R. Vol. I, p. 22 and 154. The 
affidavits of Epperson and Brzusek provided new opinions addressing the critical issue of 
medical causation. R. Vol. I, p. 511-513 and p. 543-544. The trial court concluded the affidavits 
contained new opinions, Tr. Vol. 1, p. 60, L. 4 - p. 66, L. 15; and explained why the new 
opinions were untimely. Tr. Vol. I, p. 66, L.16 - p. 72, L.21. 
During the summary judgment hearing, Zylstra did not offer an excuse for his failure to 
provide earlier supplementation. Instead, he argued his prior disclosures were adequate because 
they placed BSU on notice that more detailed opinions would be developed and offered at trial. 
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Tr. Vol. I, p. 40, L.22 - 25; p. 80, L. 17-22. This argument was rejected \'/ith tbe trial court 
stating that notice through the identification of general subject matters was insufficient as Zylstra 
was required, by the court's scheduling order and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, to provide 
the experts' actual opinions. Tr. Vol. I, p. 80, L.23 p. 81, L.Il. This ruling mirrored the courts 
prior comments and warnings it provided at tbe May 9, 2013 bearing. Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, L. 18 - p. 
19, L.8. Addressing the Zylstra's failure to timely supplement his disclosures, the court wrote: 
There is no excuse. Brzusek only met Zylstra and his wife 
six days after summary judgment was filed, six days after 
discovery was then to have been initiated and more than two weeks 
after rebuttal experts should bave been disclosed and his opinion 
was disclosed for the first time after discovery had been ... had been 
completed. These opinions were not seasonably supplemented. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 67, L.16-24. 
Addressing the opinions of Dr. Epperson, the court wrote: 
In addition, in the face of an express warning issued by this 
Court, at this point the plaintiff had an opportunity to immediately 
seasonably supplement those. The information upon which Dr. 
Epperson relied could have been looked at and immediately bave 
an update of bis expert opinion. That did not happen. Tbey could 
bave - if they had thought tbat Mr.-Dr.- I can't remember his name 
Brzusek was appropriate, he could have immediately had an 
examination and supplemented that. Neither thing was done. 
Instead, the plaintiff waited until the motion was filed and at that 
time sprang new and different opinions on the plaintiff. [sic] For 
that reason, I strike both affidavits. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 72, L. 7-21. 
The trial court's comments demonstrate it reached the decision to strike the otTending 
affidavits through an exercise of reason. The court described the deficiencies in the contents of 
the affidavits, the circumstances surrounding both of the experts developing new previoLlsly 
undisclosed opinions and, why the disclosure of those new opinions after BSU's motion for 
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summary judgment had been filed was untimely and, without legal excuse. The district court 
clearly recognized its ability to grant the motion to strike was within its discretion. It reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason and consistent with the applicable legal standards. 
3. The District Court's ruling was consistent with applicable legal 
standards. 
The determination of whether an affidavit that is filed in connection with a motion for 
summary judgment is admissible is a threshold question the trial court must address before 
determining whether an issue of fact exists in the record. See Hopper v. SWil111erton, supra, 
citing JUB Engineers vs. SCC Insurance Co. of Hartfortl, 146 Idaho 311, 314-315, 193 P.3d 
858,861-862 (2008). In Carnell vs. Barker 111anagemellt, IIlC., 137 Idaho 322, 48 P.3d 651 
(2002) the trial court struck an affidavit offered to oppose a motion for summary judgment on 
evidentiary and procedural grounds. Prior to the summary judgment proceedings, the district 
court had granted plaintiffs motion seeking permission to depose a non-witness expert who had 
removed evidence from the scene of the fire. The plaintiff's motion was supported by the 
affidavit of a retained expert, George Bidstrup, who testified "to determine the cause of the fire 
and render an opinion on the fire's origin, he needed to speak to the person who had removed 
crucial evidence from the situs of the fire." Id. at 326. Thereafter, plaintiffs never conducted 
the depositions authorized by the court or, made arrangements to meet with the witnesses. Id. 
To oppose the defendant's motion for summary jUdgment, the plaintiff provided a second 
affidavit of Mr. Bidstrup containing opinion testimony addressing the origin of the fire and, 
establishing causation. This affidavit was stricken on evidentiary grounds in addition to the fact 
Mr. Bidstrup had not been disclosed as an expert witness in violation of the court's scheduling 
order. /(f. at 326. 
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On appeal, Carnell argued the defendants ''\vere aware of appellant's intention to use 
Bidstrup as an expert, so no prejudice resulted from untimely disclosure." [d. at 327. Carnell 
also argued the trial court should have altered the scheduling order and allowed her to identify 
Bidstmp as a retained expert after the defendants filed their motion for summary judgment 
challenging causation. These arguments were rejected with this Court concluding the trial court 
had not abused its discretion when it struck the second Bidstmp affidavit after providing the 
plaintiffs "[t]ime extensions to obtain expert testimony, ordered physical evidence removed from 
the tire situs to be given to appellants for their California expert to analyze, and granted 
appellants' permission to depose !tchon, a non-witness expert." /d. at 32S. Despite these 
accommodations, the plaintiff never conducted the requested discovery and, never disclosed a 
causation expert. The suggestion the trial court should have extended the time to allow plaintiff 
to supplement the Bidstmp affidavit was rejected with this Court reasoning "[t]he appellants had 
ample notice of the hearing and knew what was required of them to survive the summary 
judgment motions." /d. at 329. In the absence of the second Bidstrup affidavit, the plaintiff 
could not create an issue of fact concerning the issue of causation. Id. at 32S. 
[n this case, the district court engaged in a very similar analysis. At the May 9, 20 l3, 
hearing, Zylstra was warned that his expert disclosures and answers to interrogatories and 
requests for production of documents were deficient. Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, L.lS - p. 19, L.S. He was 
specifically told that identifying the general subjects upon which his experts may ultimately offer 
opinions was not a sufficient response. [d. Despite having the benefit of the court's direction 
and warnings, Zylstra failed to supplement his expert disclosures or answers to written discovery 
to include opinions held by Drs. Epperson and Brzusek addressing the critical issue of medical 
causation. He also ignored the trial court's response to the hypothetical scenario posed by BSU 
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which clearly suggested a motion for summary judgment would be forthcoming and, that any 
undisclosed expert opinions offered to oppose the motion would cause BSU to file a motion to 
strike. Tr. Vol. I, p. 24, L.I 0 - p. 25, L. 22. 
Because Zylstra failed to supplement his expert disclosures, the hypothetical scenano 
posed by BSU at the May 9, 2013, hearing became a reality. BSU's motion, like the dispositive 
motion at issue in Carnell v. Barker Management, Inc., supra, alleged the defendant's actions 
did not cause the plaintiff's injuries. BSU further argued Zylstra was required to prove causation 
with expert testimony. R. Vol. I, p. 451-454. After BSU's motion was filed, Zylstra was seen, 
for the first time, by Dr. Brzusek. R. Vol. I, p. 510 (Brzusek Aff'15). Additionally, Dr. 
Epperson was provided new information to review and was asked to provide opinions on the 
issue of causation, which were not included in his earlier report. Tr. Vol. I, p. 61, L.19 - p. 62, 
L.18; R. Vol. I, p. 542 (Epperson Aff~8 and 9). See also § C(l), infra. 
Consistent with its comments during the May 9, 2013 hearing, the trial court granted 
BSU's motion to strike the Epperson and Brzusek affidavits. R. Vol. I, p. 730, Tr. Vol. I, p. 71, 
L. I - p. 72, L.21. The reasoning the court provided is analogous to the approach taken by the 
trial court in Carnell v Barker Management, Illc. where, despite the fact the challenged expert 
had filed an earlier affidavit and it was unquestioned the defendants were aware that he would, at 
some time, offer expert testimony on the issue of causation, the plaintiff was not relieved from 
the obligation to disclose the expert and his opinions as required by the court's scheduling order 
and, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. See 137 Idaho at 328.2 The fact BSU was advised that 
The trial court in Carnell also ruled the opinions in the expert affidavit sufTered evidentiary 
deficiencies which provided an alternative basis for striking the affidavit. See 137 Idaho at 326. 
This Court concluded the evidentiary issues ,vere "immaterial because the appellants never 
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Drs. Epperson and Brzusek may, at some time in the undisclosed future, develop opinions on the 
issue of causation did not relieve Zylstra from his obligation to disclose the actual opinions of his 
l'xpert witnesses. See IRCP 26(b)(4). In fact, neither expert was asked to address the causation 
issue until after BSU filed its motion for summary judgment.3 
At the October 10, 2013 hearing addressing the motion for reconsideration, Zylstra 
admitted that, when the expert disclosures were originally filed, he was aware supplementation 
was needed. His counsel advised the court: "Dr. Epperson is expected to testify that allowing 
Mr. Zylstra to continue wrestling after his initial head injury caused additional damage and the 
point was, yes, we need to amplify that." Tr. Vol. I, p. 137, L. 13-17. Counsel acknowledged 
the obligation to supplement plaintiffs' disclosures by stating they were: "obligated to provide 
more information in due course, which we were planning to do as soon as Dr. Brzusek had his 
meeting with Mr. Zylstra." Tr. Vol. I, p. 137, L. 21-24. These statements are an admission 
Zylstra was aware of the medical causation issues in early April, 2013, and that expert testimony 
would be required to establish a prima facia case of negligence. Clearly, Zylstra "knew what 
was required ... to survive the summary judgment motions." See Carnell, 137 Idaho at 329. The 
fact the experts were not asked to provide opinions addressing causation until after BSU's 
motion for summary judgment was filed confirms the trial court's ruling there was no reason the 
opinions could not have been developed and disclosed earlier. Tr. Vol. I, p. 67, L. 16-24; p. 72 
L.7-21. 
disclosed Bidstrup as an expert witness in violation of the district court's scheduling order". Id. 
at 328. 
3 Dr. Brzusek did not meet with Zylstra and, therefore, did not have a factual basis to opine on 
the causation issue, until after the motion for summary judgment was filed. R. Vol. I, p. 510. Dr. 
Epperson, in his affidavit, admits he was not asked to otTer an opinion on medical causation or, 
whether Zylstra was "insane" for purposes of tolling the notice of claim requirements, until after 
the BSU motion was filed. R. Vol. I, p. 542 (Epperson affidavit, '19). 
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In Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006) this Court addressed the 
question of when the supplementation of an expert opinion is "seasonable" as required by IRCP 
26(e)(J )(8). Trial courts were instructed to ask "was the opposing party given an opportunityfor 
.Iidl cross-examination'?" Id. at 346 (emphasis in original). In Edmunds, the defendant, St. 
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center filed a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff filed 
affidavits of Drs. Rotschafer and Hollander to oppose the motion. These affidavits were filed 
eight months prior to trial. The affidavit of Dr. Rotschafer was stricken because he had not been 
identified as an expert witness as required by the scheduling order. This aspect of the trial 
court's ruling was affirmed. See 142 Idaho at 873. The decision to strike the Hollander affidavit 
was reversed because the doctor had been timely disclosed. The fact new opinions appeared in 
his affidavit did not, automatically, require their exclusion as IRCP 26( e)(1 )(B) allows 
supplementation of previously disclosed expert opinions. See 142 Idaho at 345. This Court 
concluded the supplementation of Dr. Hollander's opinions through the challenged affidavit was 
"seasonable" because the updated opinions were provided eight months prior to trial. See 142 
Idaho at 872. 
In this case, the trial court found the Zylstra's supplementation was not seasonable. Tr. 
Vol. I, p. 70, L. 15 - p. 72, L. 21. Factors supporting the court's conclusions which establish its 
ruling was an appropriate exercise of discretion include the fact that Zylstra was warned, and was 
aware his expert disclosures required supplementation in May of 2013, long before discovery 
was to be concluded and, before the dispositive motion cut-off. The only reason new 
information was ever provided to Drs. Brzusek and Epperson to address the medical causation 
issue was the fact 8SU filed its motion for summary judgment. At that point, the discovery 
deadline had lapsed and the deadline for dispositive motions had expired. R. Vol. I, p. 21 - 23. 
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In Edmunds v. Kraner, the challenged supplementation occUlTed eight months prior to 
trial which also predated the dispositive motion deadline created by IRCP 56(b). In that case, the 
defendant was not denied the opportunity to cross-exam Dr. Hollander prior to having its motion 
for summary judgment considered. In this case, the late disclosure of Brzusek and Epperson's 
causation opinions prevented BSU from cross-examining those individuals or being able to 
challenge their opinions in connection with the motion for summary judgment. Additionally, as 
recognized by the trial court, if the untimely supplementation was allowed, the court would have 
been forced to vacate the trial. Tr. Vol. I, p. 71, L. 18 - p. 72, L. 21. Considering the lack of any 
credible explanation regarding why the expert opinions were not disclosed earlier, the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion when it concluded it would not vacate the trial and, that Zylstra had 
failed to seasonably supplement his answers to discovery as required by [RCP 26( e)( 1 )(B). This 
is the same situation which caused the expert affidavit in Carnell v. Barker l11anagement, Inc., 
supra, to be stricken. See also Clark v. Raty, 137 Idaho 343, 348,48 P.3d 672, 677 (2002) (Trial 
did not abuse its discretion by excluding an expert witness's late-disclosed opinions where there 
was no legitimate explanation why the opinions were not disclosed earlier.) 
Based upon the foregoing, and consistent with this Court's rulings JJ1 Hopper vs. 
Swinllerton, supra, Carnell vs. Barker l~talUlgemellt, IIlC., supra, and Edmunds vs. Kraner, 
supra, the district court correctly identified the evidentiary issues raised by the late disclosure of 
the BrzLlsek and Epperson opinions and, acted within the boundaries of its discretion and 
consistent with applicable legal standards by striking those affidavits. For that reason, the 
district court's decision granting BSU's motion to strike the Brzusek and Epperson affidavits 
should be aiTirmed. 
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C. Arguments Raised by Appellant that are not Supported by the Record. 
(1) Dr. Epperson's opinions on medical causation contained in his affidavit were 
"new" opinions. 
Zylstra argues the opinions expressed by Drs. Epperson and Brzusek in their atlidavits 
submitted in opposition to BSU's motion for summary judgment on July I, 2013, were not 
"new." Appellant's Brief, p. 12-16. He claims there was prior disclosure of Dr. Epperson's 
opinions on causation. Id. This contention is not supported by the record. On April 8, 2013, 
Zylstra provided his List of Experts. R. Vol. I, p. 32-38. With respect to Dr. Epperson, Zylstra 
stated that a copy of his "comprehensive report" was provided to BSU on January 28, 2012, and 
that the doctor's testimony at trial "will be consistent with his report subject to modification 
based on evidence developed after his evaluation was performed." R. Vol. I, p. 35. As to 
causation, Zylstra's disclosure simply indicated Dr. Epperson was "expected to testify" that it 
was "likely" Zylstra suffered multiple lesser brain injuries during subsequent matches. /d. 
In his "comprehensive report," Dr. Epperson did not render a definitive opinion on 
causation, instead indicating additional information was needed to reach a conclusion on that 
point. R. Vol. I, p. 582-605. Dr. Epperson stated: 
He may have sustained additional concussions when he was put 
back into matches in a state of post-traumatic amnesia. Further 
information would be helpful, but prolonged post-traumatic 
amnesia for four months suggests the likelihood of subsequent 
concussions. The significant current brain dysfunction deficits 
also suggest more than one concussion. 
R. Vol. I, p. 603 (emphasis added). 
After discussing the neuropsychological testing, Epperson concluded that "these 
problems stem from his concussion or mUltiple concussions." R. Vol. I, p. 604 (emphasis 
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added). In other words, Dr. Epperson did not have an opinion regarding the critical causation 
Issue. He could not distinguish between the initial concussion and possible subsequent 
concussions as causing Zylstra's alleged injuries or cognitive deficits.4 This is the problem with 
Dr. Epperson's opinions that Zylstra fails to comprehend. The opinions in the Epperson report 
did not address the issue of medical causation. For that reason, the opinions expressed in Dr. 
Epperson's affidavit were substantially different than the opinions expressed in his report. See R. 
543-544 and 603-604 . 
After receiving Zylstra's List of Experts, BSU sent him a letter indicating the disclosures 
were inadequate because they did not contain a complete statement of all opinions to be 
expressed. R. Vol. I, p. 126-127. In response, Zylstra disagreed that he was obligated to provide 
full opinions at that time, stating his belief that the disclosures provided a clear picture of what 
he expected his experts to say, and stating that a "very detailed repOli from Dr. Epperson" had 
been provided. R. Vol. I, p. 129. 
On April 12, 2013, BSU filed a motion to compel. R. Vol. I, p. 39-4l. The subject of the 
motion was the adequacy of Zylstra's expert disclosures. In response, Zylstra submitted the 
affidavit of James Whitehead. R. Vol. I, p. l37-143. Mr. Whitehead testified that Dr. 
Epperson's opinions had been provided "in the form of a comprehensive 24 - page report." R. 
Vol. I, p. 140. 
4 Lacking in either Drs. Epperson's or Brzusek's affidavits is any testimony stating Zylstra 
actually suffered additional concussions in his later wrestling matches. R. 511-512 and 542-543. 
Considering the video of the matches confirm he suffered no further blows to the head, R. 421 
(Hoesch Aff. '12) highlights Dr. Epperson's statement that further information was needed to 
reach an opinion regarding whether further injuries occurred or whether the concussion Zylstra 
sufTered in the first match was aggravated by his continued participation in the tournament. R. 
Vol. I, p. 603. 
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At the May 9, 2013 hearing, Zylstra stated that Dr. Epperson's report had already been 
provided along with everything else he had so far with respect to his experts. Tr. Vol. I, p. 16, L. 
21 p. 19, L. l7-18. No supplementation was provided until Dr. Epperson's atlidavit was 
submitted on July 1, 2013, in opposition to BSU's motion for summary judgment. R. Vol. I, p. 
539-554. In his atlidavit, Dr. Epperson opined for the first time that, "with [a] reasonable degree 
of neuropsychological and scientific probability ... Sam suffered additional damage as a result of 
defendants' decision to allow him to continue wrestling after his first concussion." R. Vol. I, p. 
543.5 Dr. Epperson also opined, for the first time, that it was his opinion "again expressed with 
reasonable neuropsychological or scientific probability, that Sam's ability to evaluate his 
condition. and the extent and cause of his injuries, was compromised significantly. especially 
during the first three or four months after the wrestling tournament." R. Vol. I, p. 544. These 
opinions were not expressed in Dr. Epperson's report. R. Vol. I, p. 582-605. In his report, he 
did not, and because he needed further information, could not, differentiate between Zylstra'S 
initial concussion or possible subsequent concussion(s) as the cause of his alleged cognitive 
deticits.() In contrast, in his atlidavit, Dr. Epperson differentiated between the concussions and 
opined that the alleged subsequent concussions caused Zylstra's deficits which also rendered him 
5 The suggestion Zylstra suffered additional injuries remains an incomplete and inadmissible 
Op1l110n. The Epperson atlidavit fails to identify what injuries the doctor is referencing or, 
\vhether those unidentified injuries were caused by allowing Zylstra to continue wrestling at the 
tournament. "Expeli opinion that is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by facts in the 
record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and therefore is inadmissible." 
Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Serv., 143 Idaho 834, 838, 153 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2002). Dr. 
Epperson's new opinions concerning additional undescribed injuries are conc!usory, lack 
foundation, and are therefore, inadmissible. 
6 The question of whether Zylstra has cognitive deficits is disputed in the report authored by Dr. 
Craig Beaver. R. Vol. I, p. 434; Aug R; 12118113, (Craig Beaver report). 
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unable to evaluate his condition for purposes of complying with the Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
These opinions were new and, were not disclosed prior to BSU's motion for summary judgment. 
In opposition to BSU's motion to strike, Zylstra changed his characterization of Dr. 
Epperson's report. Instead of being a "comprehensive report" it became a "preliminary report" 
in \vhich Dr. Epperson was not asked to express any opinions on the basis of reasonable medical 
or scientific probability. R. Vol. I, p. 620.7 Zylstra also argued that the language in Dr. 
Epperson's report and Zylstra's List of Experts put BSU "on notice" that it was "likely" Dr. 
Epperson would testify, "if asked," that in his opinion, allowing Zylstra to continue wrestling 
after his initial concussion had caused additional damage. R. Vol. I, p. 620-621. 
The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not suggest that it is sufficient if an expert 
disclosure puts the opposing party "on notice" of what the experts opinions are likely to be "if 
asked." Pursuant to Rule 26(b)( 4), parties are allowed to discover by interrogatory "a complete 
statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefore." Zylstra's 
argument is also inconsistent with the holdings in Carnell v. Barker It1al1agement, Inc., supra. 
and Clark v. Raty, supra. BSU was entitled to discover the actual opinions held by Dr. 
Epperson. While Zylstra's List of Experts stated that Dr. Epperson was expected to testify about 
causation, his disclosure and answers to written discovery did not identify those opinions. BSU 
was advised Dr. Epperson would testify consistent with his report. R. Vol I, p. 35. Dr. 
Epperson's report did not inc lude the opinions expressed in his affidavit. Therefore, the opinions 
expressed in the affidavit were new and, as found by the district court, untimely. 
; On appeal, Zylstra reverts back to characterizing Dr. Epperson's report as an "extensive report" 
and "thorough report." Appellant's Br., p. 11 and 13. 
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(2) Dr. Brzusek's opinions on medical causation contained in his affidavit were 
"new" opinions. 
Zylstra concedes that he did not have, and did not disclose, Dr. Brzusek's opinions on 
causation until after BSU filed its motion for summary judgment. Appellant's Br., p. 17. 
Instead, he argues that Dr. Brzusek's opinions were not "new" because they did not differ in any 
material respect from Dr. Epperson's opinions. Id., p. 19. First, if Dr. Brzusek's opinions truly 
did not differ from Dr. Epperson's opinions in any material respect, then his opinions were 
cumulative and inadmissible on that basis. Second, a similar argument was discussed and 
rejected in Carnell v. Barker Mallagement, Inc., where the plaintiff argued the defendants were 
aware of the identity of their retained expert and, that the witness would eventually develop 
expert opinions addressing causation. See 137 Idaho at 327-328. See also § B(3), supra. 
Finally, Zylstra did not raise this argument before the trial court. Arguments raised for the tirst 
time on appeal will not be considered. See Patterson v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 151 
Idaho 310, 321, 256 P.3d 718,729 (2011). 
In opposition to BSU's motion to strike, Zylstra argued that "the salient opmlOns 
contained in Dr. Brzusek's affidavit, which defense counsel asserts had not been previously 
disclosed at all, had been disclosed on a April 8 and/or on April 29." R. Vol. I, p. 623. In 
support of his motion for continuance, Zylstra again argued that Dr. Brzusek was listed as an 
expert on April 8 and that list was supplemented on April 29. R. Vol. I, p. 720. At the October 
10, 2013 hearing Zylstra also argued, for the first time, that "full disclosure" of scheduling 
problems with Dr. Brzusek was made to BSU during the May 9 motion to compel hearing, 
allegedly advising BSU and the trial court that Dr. Brzusek's opinions could not be 
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supplemented until after June 10, to which BSU did not object. Tr. Vol I, P. 121, L. 9 p. 122 
L.12. Neither of these statements are supported by the record. S 
Zylstra's List of Experts identifIed Dr. Brzusek as an osteopath who "may be called to 
testify on issues of liability and damages ... " R. Vol. I, p. 33. Further, it was expected that "if 
called," Dr. Brzusek would testify regarding the applicable standard of care and "may also testify 
regarding the likelihood that Plaintiff suffered additional injury during subsequent matches ... " 
R. Vol. 1, p. 34. Nothing further was provided regarding the doctor's opinions on causation until 
his affidavit was submitted in opposition to BSU's motion for summary judgment. R. Vol. I, p. 
508-538. In Zylstra's brief, he argues that Dr. Brzusek's opinions were supplemented on April 
29,2013, to include the following disclosure regarding causation: "In particular he will testify 
that the medical literature confIrms that allowing an athlete to retum to competition before his 
brain injury has had time to recover can lead to multiple brain injuries, or death, that could have 
been avoided with proper rest." Appellant's Br., p. 28. Zylstra's supplemental list of experts 
provided on April 29, 2013, is not in the record. Nevertheless, the quoted language above, at 
most, discloses Dr. Brzusek's opinion regarding general causation. It is not an opinion regarding 
specitlc causation and whether retuming to competition before his alleged brain injury had time 
to recover actually caused Zylstra's alleged cognitive detlcits. That opinion was not disclosed 
until Zylstra submitted Dr. Brzusek's aHldavit in opposition to BSU's motion for summary 
judgment. 
8 During the October 10, 2013 hearing the trial court advised counsel that is had listened to the 
recording of the May 9, 2012 hearing. Counsel was advised his alleged statements conceming 
Dr. Brzusek did not appear and there was nothing on the recording suggesting his alleged 
comments had been erased. Tr. Vol I, p. 144 L.18 - p. 145, L. 3. 
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In his atTidavit, for the first time, Dr. Brzusek ofTered an opll1!On regarding specific 
causation. He testified: 
Accordingly, it is my opinion, expressed with reasonable medical 
certainty, that allov/ing Sam to continue wrestling immediately 
after the timeout and then for three matches later that day and the 
next, caused additional damage and prolonged his symptoms, 
based on the literature that reveals the damage that additional 
physical exertion can cause immediately after a concussive 
incident, and the statistical likelihood that Sam would have 
recovered fully if he had been pulled from the tournament and 
allowed to rest until his symptoms disappeared ... 
R. Vol. I, p. 512-513. 
Since Plaintiff had not previously disclosed any of Dr. Brzusek's opinions regarding specific 
causation prior to submitting his affidavit, this opinion was clearly a "new" opinion.9 
Furthermore, Zylstra never informed BSU that he was having any difficulty scheduling 
an appointment with Dr. Brzusek and, therefore, BSU never agreed or acquiesced in allowing 
Zylstra to supplement Dr. Brzusek's opinions after June 10,2013. In fact, at the May 9, 2013, 
hearing on BSU's motion to compel, Zylstra represented that Dr. Brzusek was only a consulting 
expert which he mayor may not call to testify. It was Dr. Heygyvary that Zylstra represented he 
was going to see in June. Counsel advised the court: 
Dr. Brzusek right as of now he is a consulting expert we may call. 
We did disclose some basic outlines of what he might testify to. 
Where our client is in Seattle this summer, you may see Dr. 
Brzusek. Dr. Brzusek is a physician in Bellevue. That actually 
that's Dr. Brzusek. If Dr. Brzusek believes an examination is 
necessary, then it will be done and in which case we will timely 
supplement and provide that report. Dr. H-e-y-g-y-v-a-r-y I 
won't try to pronounce that - is to see Mr. Zylstra in June of this 
9 Dr. Brzusek's reference to "additional damage", like the affidavit of Dr. Epperson, fails to 
describe the additional damage. This aspect of his affidavit is incomplete as it fails to fully 
disclose his opinions. Standing alone, his opinion on this issue is conclusory and inadmissible. 
See Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Serv., supra. 
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year in Seattle. And when that occurs we will then timely provide 
that report. 
Vol. I, p. 16, L. 8-20. 
Accordingly, as of May 9, it was still undecided whether Zylstra would ever see Dr. 
Brzusek or whether the doctor would be anything other than a consulting expert as opposed to a 
trial witness. Zylstra reiterated this point. 
And so what I'm saying is we have provided everything that we 
have so far. Dr. Brzusek, if he determines that he needs to see and 
examine him, there will be a supplementation which will include 
that report. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 19, L. 17-21. 
Moreover, Zylstra made this same argument during the hearing on his motion for 
continuance. The trial court took a recess to listen to the recording of the May 9, 2013, hearing 
and informed Zylstra that no such representation occurred. Tr. Vol. I, p. 144, L. 18 p. 145, L.3. 
Zylstra then expressed his concern the recording stopped early or otherwise did not pick up his 
comments. Tr. Vol. I, p. 162, L. 7 -~ p. 163, L. 6. The trial court specifically informed Zylstra 
that the recording actually continued into the next hearing and it was clearly stated that Dr. 
Brzusek was only a consulting expert who mayor may not see Zylstra at some unspecified time 
that summer. Tr. Vol. I, p. 163, L. 7 - p. 164, L. 2. The transcript reflects the trial court's 
representation of the testimony during the motion to compel hearing. Yet, incredulously. Zylstra 
continues to argue he represented to the trial court and BSU during the May 9 hearing that 
Zylstra was set to see Dr. Brzusek on June 10, despite the fact the record is completely devoid of 
any support for that statement. 
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(3) Zylstra could not have reasonably believed that supplementing his expert's 
opinions after the dispositive motion deadline was timely. 
Zylstra argues that since the trial court did not impose a deadline for supplementing his 
expert disclosures, his supplementation after BSU filed its motion for summary judgment was 
timely. Appellant's Br., p. 20-23. Based upon his beliefit was understood Zylstra was to see Dr. 
Brzusek in June, "Sam's counsel decided it made sense, consistent with their understanding of 
'seasonable supplementation,' to await Dr. Brzusek's written report before providing his opinion 
and further supplementation, as necessary, of their other experts' opinions." Appellant's Br., p. 
20-21. This position was unreasonable in light of the discovery deadlines and the hypothetical 
BSU posed during the motion to compel hearing. 
The trial court issued is Order Goveming Proceedings and Setting Trial on July 13, 2012 
("Scheduling Order"). R. Vol. I, p. 21-25. The Scheduling Order set the trial to commence on 
September 30, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 21. Plaintiff's expe11 disclosure deadline was 180 days before 
trial, or by April 3. 2013. R. Vol. 1, p. 23. All discovery was to be initiated 120 days before trial, 
or by June 2, 2013. Id. Dispositive motions were to be filed so they could be argued 90 days 
before trial, or by July 2, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 22. Since summary judgment motions needed to be 
heard by July 2, 2013, they needed to be filed by June 4, 2013, in order to comply with Idaho 
Rule of Ci vii Procedure 56( c). 
At the May 9, 2013 motion to compel hearing, the trial court explained its interpretation 
of the interplay between IRCP 26(b)( 4) and the expert disclosure deadline to mean a party is 
entitled to discover the information allowed under Rule 26(b)( 4), but only if requested through 
an intelTogatory, request for production, or deposition. Tr. Vol. I, p.ll, L. 1 p. 14, L. 16. The 
trial court further explained that the obligation to provide that information was a continuing 
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obligation that must be supplemented both before and after the expert disclosure deadline. /d. 
The trial court reviewed Zylstra's List of Expe11s and agreed they were insufficient to answer 
BSU's specific discovery requests seeking disclosure of the expert's opinions. Tr. Vol. I, p. 18, 
L. 18 p. 19, L. 8. The trial court then indicated it would not rule on the motion to compel, but 
believed it put all parties on notice of how it interpreted and would apply the discovery and 
expe11 disclosure requirements. At that point, BSU posed the following hypothetical: 
MR. COLLAER: One question I have in clarification, Judge, is the 
issue that I have is - not to say it happens in this case, but it often 
does and it may come up in this case, is an issue the plaintiffs 
prima facie case will require expert testimony. And at the time of 
close of discovery and time for filing motions for summary 
judgment, when that time comes, if that opinion has not been 
disclosed, it would be my position and I'd welcome your input 
on this - that if the motion is filed and it raises that point, a 
disclosure at that point to respond to the motion for summary 
judgment would engender a motion to strike, which I hope would 
be granted, and the record would be what it is. 
Tr. Vol. I, p. 24, L. 10-24. 
It was clear by this hypothetical, that BSU was concerned Zylstra would fail to 
supplement his expert disclosures and/or discovery responses to disclose the actual opinions held 
by his experts prior to the dispositive motion deadline. The trial court indicated that while it 
would not rule in a vacuum, it would have to be an extraordinary situation for it to allow 
someone close to trial to change expert opinions such that it would prejUdice the other side and it 
assured the parties that it would enforce the rules. Tr. Vol. I, p. 25, L. 1-22. This colloquy 
clearly advised and warned Zylstra that if he attempted to introduce new expert opinions 
regarding a prima facie element of his case after the close of discovery, and after BSU filed its 
motion for summary judgment, a motion to strike those opinions would be filed which the trial 
court would entertain absent an extraordinary situation. Considering discovery closed on June 2, 
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2013, and the last date for filing dispositive motions was June 4, 2013, it was unreasonable for 
Zylstra to believe that he could supplement his expeli disclosures to introduce new and 
previollsly undisclosed opinions regarding causation after June 4, 2013. 
(4) There was no "implicit agreement" to extend the deadline for Zylstra to disclose 
expert opinions 
Unjustifiably, Zylstra argues there was an "implicit agreement" that discovery was 
ongoing, presumably to imply that there was an agreement that he could provide new expeI1 
opinions after the close of discovery. Appellant's Br., p. 19. He contends that communications 
between the parties persuaded him that additional discovery would be conducted. [d. While 
this contention is unsupported by the record, even if it were true, an agreement to conduct 
additional discovery does not equate to an agreement that he could disclose new opinions 
regarding causation after the close of discovery and after the summary judgment motion had 
been filed. Either way, Zylstra'S claim does not stand up to scrutiny. 
Zylstra only cites to one email communication as support for his contention of an implicit 
agreement. Appellant's Br., p. 19; R. Vol. I, p. 706. In that email, dated June 3, 2013, Zylstra 
simply states that "we need to discuss and make decisions about mediation and further discovery, 
particularly expert discovery." R. Vol. I, p. 706. While BSU's response to that email is not in the 
record, Zylstra acknowledges that it did not address the issue of further discovery. Appellant's 
Br., p. 19. Since that is the only communication relied upon by Zylstra, and BSU did not respond 
to it, it cannot stand for the proposition that there was an agreement between the parties, implicit 
or otherwise. This is especially true given the fact BSU filed its motion for summary judgment 
on June 4, 2013, the day after this email, arguing that Zylstra did not have the requisite medical 
opinions on causation to prove his prima facie case. 
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On July 12,2013, BSU notified Zylstra that its liability expert had a conflict of interest 
and had to be withdrawn. R. Vol. I, p. 708. Zylstra argues that this is further evidence of an 
Implicit agreement that expert discovery was ongoing. Appellant's Br., p. 19-20. However, 
Zylstra argues that he relied upon the alleged implicit agreement to justify disclosing his expert 
opinions on causation with his opposition to BSU's motion for summary judgment on July 1, 
2013. Since BSU did not withdraw its liability expeli until after Zylstra filed his opposition, he 
could not have relied upon that withdrawal when deciding to wait until tiling his opposition to 
disclose his expert's new opinions. 
Furthermore, Zylstra's claim of an implicit agreement becomes even more specious when 
considering BSU's attempts to obtain timely disclosure of his expert's opinions. Zylstra's expert 
disclosures were originally due on April 3, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 23. The week prior, Zylstra 
requested an extension of time to disclose his experts, to which BSU indicated that it could not 
agree to a lengthy extension. R. Vol. I, p. 123. On April 2, 2013, Zylstra again requested an 
extension of time to disclose his experts. R. Vol. I, p. 123. BSU agreed to extend the disclosure 
deadline to April 8, 2013, and specifically indicated that "the expert disclosure must comply with 
IRCP 26(b)(4)." R. Vol. I, p. 122. 
Zylstra provided his List of Experts on April 8, 2013. R. Vol. I, p. 32-38. On April 10, 
2013, BSC sent Zylstra a letter requesting immediate supplementation of his disclosures because 
they did not provide a complete statement of his experts' opinions in compliance with Rule 
26(b)(4) or in response to BSU's discovery requests. R. Vol. I, p. 126-127. When Zylstra failed 
and refused to supplement his expeli disclosures, BSU filed a motion to compel seeking a court 
order requiring him to provide a complete statement of his experts' opinions and the bases for 
those opinions. R. Vol. I, p. 39-40. During the motion to compel hearing, BSU presented the 
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court with a hypothetical indicating it would move to strike any new expe11 opinions submitted 
after its summary judgment motion was filed. Tr. Vol. I, p. 24., L. lO-24. When Zylstra filed new 
expert opinions in opposition to BSU's motion for summary judgment, BSU moved to strike 
those opinions. R. Vol. I, p. 565-577. BSU's conduct clearly indicates that it was, at all times, 
attempting to obtain a complete statement of Zylstra's experts' opinions in a timely manner and 
in accordance with the deadlines set f0l1h in the Scheduling Order. BSU's conduct does not 
support Zylstra's contention that there was an implicit agreement whereby he could submit new 
and previously undisclosed opinions after the close of discovery or after BSU filed its motion for 
summary judgment. 
D. Any Suggestion of Judicial Bias is Frivolous. 
Zylstra asserts that the trial judge was biased as an alternative basis for overturning the 
district court's decision to strike the Epperson and Brzusek affidavits. A claim of judicial bias, 
absent a motion to disqualify the judge below, will not be considered on appeal. Sanchez v. 
State, 2013 WL 6004169,*6 (CLApp. 2013); Johnson v. lMcPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 469, 210 P.3d 
563, 577 (CLApp. 2009); See also IMcPheters v. ilJaile, 138 Idaho 391, 396-97, 64 P.3d 317, 
322-23 (2003). Zylstra did not tile a motion to disqualify the trial judge. Therefore, he cannot 
claim judicial bias for first time on appeal. 
Even if the Court decides to consider Zylstra's new argument, he has not satisfied the 
legal standard for proving judicial bias. In Bach v. Bagley, this Court explained that "unless 
there is a demonstration of 'pervasive bias' derived either from an extra judicial source or facts 
and events occuning at trial, there is no basis for judicial recusal." 14g Idaho 784, 792, 229 P.3d 
1146, 1154 (2010) citing Liteky v. United States, 5lO U.S. 540, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 
(1994). This Court quoted with approval the following language from Liteky: 
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It is enough for present purposes to say the following: First, 
judicial rulings alone almost never constitute valid basis for a bias 
or partiality motion '" and can only in the rarest circumstances 
evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required .... 
Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not for 
recusal. Second, opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts 
introduced or events occurring in the course of the current 
proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a 
bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep seated 
favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment 
impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of the trial 
that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the 
parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality 
challenge.... A judge's ordinary etTorts at courtroom 
administration even a stem and short-tempered judge's ordinary 
efforts at courtroom administration remain immune. 
Id., quoting Liteky, 540 U.S. at 555-556, 114 S.Ct. at 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d at 490-9\. 
Therefore, the standard to prove judicial bias, "based simply on information that [the judge] has 
learned in the course of judicial proceedings, is extremely high." [d. 
Zyltra's claim of judicial bias is based only on the judicial remarks made during the 
various hearings and the fact he was not allowed to introduce new expert opinions to oppose 
summary judgment. The remarks upon which Zylstra relies do not demonstrate any judicial bias. 
They are all trivial in nature and had no bearing on the district court's decision to strike the 
expert affidavits or grant summary judgment. Some of the remarks had even been corrected by 
the district court during the hearings. For example, Zylstra contends the district court was biased 
because it stated there was 120 days to provide notice of a tort claim under the Idaho Tort Claims 
Act rather than 180 days. Appellant's Br., p. 25. However, during the summary judgment 
hearing, the district court corrected itself when it stated: "And for the record. I keep saying 120. 
I apologize. It's 180." Tr. Vol. 1, p. 99, L. 2-3. 
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Also, Zylstra contends that the district court's statements that trial was six weeks a\vay is 
evidence of bias because the trial was actually seven weeks and four days away. Appellant's Br., 
p. 25. However, the district court corrected itself on this statement as well: "And like I said, I 
don't think it's appropriate to have experts meeting with your client for the first time after 
discovery and just really just prior to trial. Trial the jury trial date the summary judgment 
hearing was August 8th , seven weeks and a few days before triaL" Tr. Vol. I, p. 165, L. 8-14. 
Zylstra takes exception to the district court characterizing seven weeks as being "just 
prior to triaL" Appellant's Br., p. 26. Yet, the fact is, seven weeks before trial is really "just 
prior to tria!." This is especially true considering the case had been pending for seventeen 
months and Zylstra knew, or should have known, that medical expert opinions were necessary to 
establish causation not only for liability, but also to show the deadline for filing his notice of tort 
claim should be tolled. 
Moreover, vlewmg the record as a whole, the district court actually gave Zylstra 
favorable rUlings. First, it did not enter a ruling on BSU's motion to compel even though it 
stated that Zylstra's expert disclosures and discovery responses were insufficient. Tr. Vol. I, p. 
18, L. 18 p. 19, L. 8; p. 23, L. 24 p. 25, L. 9. Second, the district court also ruled in Zylstra's 
favor on the motion to strike pOliions of his lay witness affidavits. Tr. Vol. I, p. 72, L. 22 p. 
80, L. 8. Finally, the district court ruled in Zylstra'S favor on a significant issue on summary 
judgment, finding an issue of fact existed as to whether the deadline for filing his notice of tort 
claim should be tolled. In fact, the district court explained that it "went out on a very long limb 
to deny summary judgment on that issue." Tr. Vol. I, p. 140, L. 3-5. 
When reviewing the record as a whole it is evident the district court was not biased in any 
way. The district court rendered procedural, admissibility, and substantive rulings in Zylstra's 
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favor throughout the proceedings. The evidence of bias relied upon by Zylstra is either 
inaccurate and/or trivial and had no bearing on the outcome of the case. There has certainly been 
no demonstration of a " pervasive bias" by the judicial remarks made by the district court. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, the ruling of the district court striking the affidavits of 
Drs. Epperson and Brzusek offered in opposition to BSU's motion for summary judgment should 
be affirmed. 
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